Introduction
The main argument of this paper is that the re is a convergence of security challenges in Southeast Asia and the OECD world, although differences in scope and approaches to tackle them remain. This means that in Southeast Asia inter-state wars and other conventional security threats such as territorial disputes and arms races have subsided in the last ten to fifteen years, while the region is increasingly confronted with non-conventional security risks emanating from international terrorism and organized crime, separatism and piracy, irregular migration, environmental issues, energy shortages, economic crises and epidemics such as HIV/AIDS and SARS. Some of these new security issues are closely intertwined and hence aggravate the risks as well as impeding solutions. The increasing similarities of security challenges may be explained by the ambiguities of globalization. Like the OECD world, even if for different reasons, Asian governments (including regional great powers such as China and India) prioritize economic development. They pursue policies promoting economic growth which, they believe, w ill attract investors and capital, stimulate technological progress, save or create jobs and hence, strengthen their legitimacy. These objectives can be best pursued in a peaceful international environment, free from armed conflict, tensions and costly defense commitments. The flipside of their growing integration into the world economy is an increasing interdependence which gives rise to many of the bordercrossing pathologies of globalization mentioned above. They call for new cooperative security approaches to which, however, Southeast Asian governments subscribe only hesitantly.
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Conventional security threats
With the end of the Cold War the OECD world was freed from the tensions and risks arising from the confrontation of two military pacts, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact Organization, which had kept each other in check for nearly four decades mainly by means of nuclear deterrence. In Southeast Asia, the confrontation fed first by the bipolar and later the tripolar great power rivalry between the United States, the Soviet Union and China also receded. The Soviet Union, and after its collapse in 1991, Russia, ended its military presence in Indochina and stopped alimenting the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. Vietnam, in turn, sought to compensate the loss of Russian support by a rapprochement with the Associatio n of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), eventually becoming a member of the grouping in 1995. At the same time, it sought to improve its relations with China with whom it fought a war in 1979, was locked in violent border incidents throughout the 1980s and with whose navy it clashed in the Spratlys in 1988.
However, u nlike in Europe, the ideological underpinnings of inter-state conflict did not entirely disappear as China, Vietnam and Laos still adhere to a socialist political order. While, as we kno w from regime theory, ideological conflict is the type most resistent to mediation and resolution, the policy of economic liberalization pursued by these countries has relegated ideological issues to a backseat.
Today the l ikelihood of inter-state wars in Southeast Asia is greatly diminished, althoughunlike in the OECD world -territorial disputes and conflicting claims in maritime areas still linger. Most of them have not been resolved, but rather bracketed or swept under the carpet.
The still most contested issue is the demarcation of maritime borders in the South China Sea where at least six claimants -China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brune i -have occupied atolls and islets in the Spratly archipelago and erected military installations.
The South China Sea is believed to be rich in natural gas, oil and fish, although there are 4 conflicting estimates about the size of the deposits. As early as 1992, ASEAN's Manila Declaration sought to oblige all claimants to abstain from actions which would heighten tensions in the area. However, ASEAN's policy of restraint initially fell on deaf ears in China.
As a latecomer among the claimants, China passed a law on the territorial sea and the contiguous zone in February 1992 on which it based its U-shaped claim covering almost the entire South China Sea. In 1995, China occupied Mischief Reef, which was claimed by the Philippines as part of their Kalayaan islands, and in 1998 it reinforced the structures set up there in 1995. While Beijing proposed joint development of the resources, it refused to enter into multilateral negotiations, insisting on bilateral talks which would have give n it an edge over its neighbors. However, increased American military presence in the region after Other Asian hot spots which may trigger inter-state wars such as Taiwan, the Korean peninsula and Kashmir are located outside the region. Even if they explode into armed conflicts, their effects on Southeast Asia will be more of an ind irect nature. They may increase the presence of external powers and militarize the region, but it is unlikely that the y will draw the region into hostilities. Also supporting the convergence argument is the fact that, like much of the OECD world (except for Japan and South Korea), Southeast Asia is mainly threatened by nuclear proliferation outside the region. In the region, the danger of horizontal proliferation i s next to zero. All three constraints on nuclear proliferation named by Rod Lyon exist in Southeast Asia : no or only restricted access to fissile material, lack of technological skill to build nuclear devices and the non-existence of any compelling motivation to overcome the first two barriers. While ASEAN has convincingly shown its intention to comply with the nonproliferation norm by establishing a Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) in 1995, risks persist due to the fact that nuclear powers including India, Pakistan and North Korea have so far not acceded to the convention.
Less clear is the convergence argument in the area of conventional armaments. While after the end of the Cold War, the OECD world experienced a process of arms reduction, Southeast Asia was widely perceived as engaging in a veritable spree of buying weapons. Some of the weapons no longer used in the West even found their way to Southeast Asia as the sale of the GDR navy by the German federal governme nt to Indonesia shows. This led some observers to speak of an unfolding arms race, motivated partly by substantial increases in Chinese and Indian defense spendings and partly by the scramble for resource-rich maritime zones. Others were less alarmist and spoke of a process of arms modernization and an adjustment of defense capabilities to the increased economic potentials. Yet, as the increases in defense expenditures were substantial in absolute terms and as arms modernization pursued the objective of power projection, the concern of observers could not entirely be dismissed. For the outside observer it was particularly worrying that in most countries military modernization was widely accepted by the public as a symbol of national strength. Unlike in the West, there was, with the exception of some members of the local and transnational NGO community, no pacifist movement pushing for disarmament. Unlike developments in the OECD world, Southeast Asia witnessed an increasing penetration of external forces. While the OECD world is characterized by U.S. dominance, it is important to note that it is no netheless a dominance exercised by an external power. Ever since the inauguration of its ZOPFAN concept in 1974, ASEAN sought to reduce external influences and to avoid becoming a theatre of great power rivalries. While ASEAN indeed successfully emancipated itself from the influence of external powers in the 1990s and was on the way to becoming a "regional security manager" (Haacke), the more recent past has seen a reversal of this trend. It would however be wrong to attribute this change entirely to the repercussions of September 11. External influences on the region already began to increase after the Asian financial crisis which exposed the weakness of regional institutions and left crisis management to the international financial organizations dominated by the West and, in particular, the U.S. The crisis virtually paralyzed ASEAN and engulfed the grouping in acrimonious disputes over its principles of cooperation. ASEAN was thus unable to act in the East Timor crisis and grudgingly had to leave its resolution to an UN intervention led by Australia, the self-styled deputy sheriff of the U.S. Even prior to September 11, the U.S. 
Non-Conventional Security Risks
Like in the OECD world, international terrorism has gained highest priority on the security agenda of Southeast Asian nations since September 11. While terrorism is a new type of threat neither for Southeast Asia nor the OECD world, the challenge is its increasingly transnational organization and the fact that it is often directed against "soft" targets and Malaysia (KMM) and Abu Sayyaf to al-Qaeda exists, the cohesion and intensity of these links is difficult to gauge. Views portraying Southeast Asia as a launching pad and a haven for international terrorism seem to be as much off the mark as categorizing the MILF and Abu Sayyaf as "associate groups of al-Qaeda" (Gunaratna). Some of the sources cited by the proponents of the second front hypothesis come from rather dubious and murky sources.
Recent assessments of the Muslim unrest in the South of Thailand also deny that international terrorist networks have any hand in it (Bünte). Here is also a link to international terrorism as terrorist cells may also make use of poorly supervised banking systems in their attempt to get access to funds for the purchase of arms and explosives. These risks also exist in the OECD world, although more effective monitoring and enforcement help to contain them.
Fragile democratization also poses security risks. These are certainly greater in Southeast Asia than in the OECD world. One reason is that democracy is deeply embedded in most OECD societies and even in Eastern Europe's new democracies it is less fragile than in Southeast 13 Asia. Although democratization has made considerable headway since the Philippine people's power revolt, there are still several semi-democratic, socialist and outrightly authoritarian regimes in the region. Moreover, even the countries which have experienced democratic transition are often disparagingly categorized as "electoral democracies," "defective democracies" or "delegative democracies." H uman rights violations, political repression, discrimination of minorities and endemic corruption are major impediments to human security and socioeconomic reform in these polities. As they encourage veto powers including Singapore is mainly a net receiver. At present there are about seven million migrants in the region. Indonesia also has become a transit country for migrants from the Middle East en route to Australia. As much of this migration is irregular, especially from Indonesia to Malaysia, periodic expulsions of illegal migrants by Malaysia have strained mutual relations.
Many of these migrants are smuggled into the country by dubious syndicates, leaving the migrant workers exposed to the whims of the ir employers and the authorities in the receiving countries.
Other non-conventional security problems transcending borders are environmental problems such as haze, the loss of biodiversity and climate change. They are caused by illegal logging and swidden agriculture and in the past mainly originated from Indonesia. Mechanisms of cooperative security such as the ASEAN High Council and the Troika have never been used to settle security problems. Even more disturbing is the fact that cooperation occasionally takes a backseat in the face of aggressive nationalist rhetoric as evidenced during the Asian financial crisis. This has adverse cognitive effects as such rhetoric keeps alive primordial stereotypes and other prejudices which hamstring cooperation.
While in the OECD world security is increasingly viewed as a common good and nonconventional security challenges are tackled by regime-building, there is little progress in this direction in Southeast Asia. This holds particularly true for problems such as international migration, environmental degradation and epidemics. Except for the emergence of epistemic communities and track two meetings in these areas, these issues still tend to be handled nationally. Even when ASEAN ministerial meetings do tackle the m, they hardly go beyond non-binding declarations which may at best be considered proto-regimes (Aggarwal) emphasizing certain common principles, but usually not transcend ing this early stage of regime-building. Separatism, too, even if it has bordercrossing consequences, has always been seen as a threat that should be handled nationally and preferably by military force. Although there was mediation by Indonesia and Malaysia in the Moro conflict and some Philippine and Thai involvement in Aceh, ASEAN countries are averse to multilateral mediation. However, their reliance on military solutions is highly counterproductive as rebel demands move from autonomy to secession. Governments usually fail to recognize the highly complex nature of these conflicts and the cognitive processes underlying them. They are usually shaped by previous interactions, socioeconomic disparities, experiences of political and cultural discrimination and single traumatic incidents which are revitalized by the collective memory whenever inter-ethnic relations deteriorate.
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National sovereignty is still the most essential value in Southeast Asian security discourse, even though it came under pressure in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis. However, Thai and Philippine moves towards "flexible engagement" and "enhanced interaction" did not find acceptance by the majority of AS EAN governments. More recently Indonesia also saw turned down its calls for an ASEAN peace keeping force. This shows the thorny path towards human security, the type of security which is closest to the liberal pole on the realismliberalism continuum of security concepts.
